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William Henry Furman, a 26 year old black man, entered the home
of William Micke, Jr. intending to burglarize it. Hearing a noise in
an adjacent room, the defendant began to withdraw when he tripped
over a wire and fell. This caused the gun he was carrying to discharge
through a closed door, killing Micke, who was in the next room.Furman was tried and convicted of murder 2 in a Georgia court. He
was sentenced to death pursuant to the statute, which provided in part:
The punishment for persons convicted of murder shall be death,
but may be confinement in the penitentiary for life in the following cases: If the jury trying the case shall so recommend, or if the
conviction is founded solely on circumstantial testimony, the presiding judge may sentence to confinement in the penitentiary for
life. In the former case it is not discretionary with the judge; in
the latter it is.3

The conviction and sentence were affirmed by the Georgia Supreme
Court.

4

Lucious Jackson, Jr., a 21-year-old black man, entered the home
of a white woman one day after her husband had left for work. While
holding a pair of scissors against her throat he forced her to look for
money. Unable to find any, the woman attempted to take the scissors

away from the defendant. He retained control over the weapon and
keeping it pressed against her throat, raped her. 5 Jackson was tried
and convicted of rape6 in a Georgia court. He was sentenced to death
pursuant to the statute, which provided:
The crime of rape shall be punished by death, unless the jury
recommends mercy, in which event punishment shall be imprison1 Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 294 n.48 (Brennan, J., concurring), rehearing
denied, 409 U.S.- (1972).
2 GA. CODE ANN. § 26-1002 (1953). The 1972 revision (§ 26-1101) is substantially the
same.
3 GA. CODE ANN. § 26-1005 (Cum. Supp. 1971). The 1972 revision (§ 26-1101 (c)) is
substantially the same.
4 Furman v. State, 225 Ga. 253, 254, 167 S.E.2d 628, 629 (1969). The Georgia Supreme
Court rejected a challenge based upon the eighth amendment. Id.
5 Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 252 (Douglas, J., concurring), rehearing denied,
409 U.S.- (1972).
6 GA. CODE ANN. § 26-1301 (1953). The 1972 revision (§ 26-2001) is substantially the
same.
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ment for life: Provided, however, the jury in all cases may fix the
punishment by imprisonment and labor in
the penitentiary for not
7
less than one year nor more than 20 years.
The conviction and sentence were affirmed by the Georgia Supreme
8
Court.
Elmer Branch, a 19-year-old black man, entered the home of a
65-year-old white woman by climbing through a window. Once inside,
he raped her and robbed her of a meager amount of money." Branch was
tried and convicted of rape' 0 by a Texas court. He was sentenced to
death pursuant to the statute, which provided:
A person guilty of rape shall be punished by death or by confinement in the penitentiary for life, or for any term of years not
less than five."
The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed both the conviction
12
and sentence.
The United States Supreme Court agreed to hear the appeals in
these cases,' 3 limiting argument to the issue of whether the death
penalty violated the eighth 14 and fourteenth 5 amendments. The Court,
by a 5-4 decision, issued a per curiam opinion holding
that the imposition and carrying out of the death penalty in these

cases constitutes cruel and unusual punishment in violation of
the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments. 16
7 GA. CODE ANN. § 26-1302 (Cum. Supp. 1971). The 1972 revision (§ 26-2001) is
substantially the same.
8 Jackson v. State, 225 Ga. 790, 794, 171 S.E.2d 501, 504 (1969).
9 Branch v. State, 447 S.W.2d 932, 933 (Tex. Crim. App. 1969).
10 TEx. PENAL CODE ANN. art. 1183 (1961).
11 TEx. PENAL CODE ANN. art. 1189 (1961).
12 Branch v. State, 447 S.W.2d 932, 935 (Tex. Crim. App. 1969). The Texas Court of
Criminal Appeals rejected a challenge based upon the eighth amendment. Id.
13 Furman v. Georgia, 403 U.S. 952 (1971). Certiorari was granted in a fourth case,
Aikens v. California, 403 U.S. 952 (1971), but was dismissed as moot upon petitioner's
suggestion, 406 U.S. 813, 814 (1972), after the California Supreme Court ruled that the
death penalty violated art. 1, § 6 of the California Constitution: People v. Anderson, 6
Cal. 3d 628, 656-57, 493 P.2d 880, 889, 100 Cal. Rptr. 152, 171, cert. denied, 406 U.S. 958
(1972).
14 U.S. CONsr. amend. VIII provides:
Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel
and unusual punishments inflicted.
15 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 provides in part:
No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or
immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any
person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any
person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.
16 Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 239-40, rehearing denied, 409 U.S.- (1972).
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All nine justices filed separate opinions in Furman v. Georgia."
The Court was faced with the problem of defining more precisely
the scope of the eighth amendment's prohibition of cruel and unusual
punishments. 18 They began by tracing the development of the eighth
amendment and discussing its judicial history.19
The eighth amendment's prohibition of cruel and unusual punishments is derived from the English Bill of Rights. 20 Commentators and
jurists have differed as to whether the English provision was designed
to operate against "disproportionate penalties" or "tortuous and barbarous punishments." 21 It would appear, however, that the Framers
22
of the United States Constitution intended to proscribe the latter.
Support for this conclusion can be drawn from the debates called to
ratify the Federal Constitution. In those debates, drafters of state bills of
rights 23-which contained the words of the eighth amendment almost
verbatim-reflected upon the absence of a cruel and unusual punishment clause in the Federal Constitution. 24 The adoption of the eighth
17 408 U.S. 238, 240, rehearing denied, 409 U.S.- (1972).
s Id. at 258 (Brennan, J., concurring).
19 Id. at 241-55 (Douglas, J., concurring), 258-82 (Brennan, J., concurring), 316-36
(Marshall, J., concurring), 376-84 (Burger, C.J., joined by Blackmun, Powell & Rehnquist
JJ., dissenting) [hereinafter cited as Burger, C.J., dissenting], 418-33 (Powell, J., joined by
Burger, C.J., Blackmun & Rehnquist, JJ., dissenting) [hereinafter cited as Powell, J.,
dissenting].
20 1 Win. & M., sess. 2, c.2 (1688) provides:
That excessive baile ought not to be required nor excessive fines imposed nor
cruell and unusuall punishments inflicted.
For the history of the English origins of the clause, see Granucci, "Nor Cruel and
Unusual Punishments Inflicted:" The Original Meaning, 57 CALIF. L. REv. 839 (1969).
21 The early cases suggest the latter. Gottlieb, Testing the Death Penalty, 34 S. CAL.
L. REv. 268, 271 (1961); Note, The Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause and the
Substantive Criminal Law, 79 HARv. L. REv. 635, 637 (1966). But see Granucci, supra
note 20, at 865.
22 Granucci, supra note 20, at 865. The author concluded that the Framers misinterpreted the English history of the background of the clause, relying particularly upon
Blackstone in drafting the eighth amendment.
23 E.g., Virginia Declaration of Rights (1776), Delaware Declaration of Rights (1776),
Maryland Declaration of Rights (1776), Massachusetts Declaration of Rights (1780), New
Hampshire Bill of Rights (1783). 1 B. SCHWARTZ, THE BILL OF RiGHTS: A DOCUMENTARY
HISTORY 276-81, 337-42, 374-79 (1971).
24 Patrick Henry, at the Virginia Convention, remarked:
By this Constitution, some of the best barriers of human rights are thrown away.
Is there not an additional reason to have a bill of rights? ... What says our bill
of rights?-"that excessive bail ought not to be required, nor excessive fines
imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted." Are you not, therefore,
now calling on those gentlemen who are to compose Congress, to prescribe trials
and define punishments without this control? . . .
... They may introduce the practice ...
of torturing, to extort a confession
of the crime. .. . We are then lost and undone.
3 THE DEBATES IN THE- SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS ON THE ADOPTION OF THE FEDERAL
CONSTITUTION 446-48 (J. Elliot ed. 1888).
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amendment by the first Congress evoked little debate. 25
The first judicial mention of the cruel and unusual punishment
26
clause appeared in the Court's opinion in Pervear v. Commonwealth,
but the first major challenge based on the clause arose in Wilkerson
v. Utah.27 The defendant in Wilkerson was sentenced to death by
shooting and he contended that the imposition of the death penalty by
that method was contrary to the eighth amendment. 28 The Court
attempted to define the limits of the eighth amendment by examining
the historical background of cruel and unusual punishment. The Court
referred to Blackstone, 29 who had reported that "terror, pain, or disgrace are superadded" to the death penalty, 30 and concluded that it
was "safe to affirm that punishments of torture . . . and all others in
the same line of unnecessary cruelty, are forbidden .... .,l Since the

Court determined that shooting was not included in that category and
was a common method of execution by the military in the territory, it
32
found that the punishment was not cruel and unusual.
Twelve years later, in 1890, another case came before the Supreme
Court that challenged the infliction of the death penalty by a particular
method as cruel and unusual. The defendant in In re Kemmler3 was
sentenced by a New York court to death by electrocution. 34 The Court,
referring to the English origins of the eighth amendment and to
Wilkerson, reasoned that the amendment proscribed those punishments
25 See Granucci, supra note 20, at 842.
26 72 U.S. (5 Wall.) 475, 479-80 (1867). The Court held that the eighth amendment
was not applicable to the states, relying upon Barron v. Baltimore, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 243,
250 (1833), which held that the Bill of Rights applied only to the federal government in
the absence of specific language to the contrary. This was before passage of the fourteenth amendment, which today has allowed most of the provisions of the first eight
amendments to be applied against the states. See, e.g., Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145
(1968) (sixth amendment right to a jury trial); Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1 (1964) (fifth
amendment privilege against self-incrimination); Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660
(1962) (eighth amendment proscription against cruel and unusual punishments); Mapp v.
Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961) (fourth amendment ban on unreasonable searches and seizures).
27 99 U.S. 130 (1879).
28 The defendant challenged the mode of punishment; he did not contend the
death penalty was per se unconstitutional. Id. at 136-37.
29 Id. at 135. The punishments included: "embowelled alive, beheaded . . . quartered
....
public dissection ... and burning alive." Id.
30 4 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES 370 (5th ed. 1773); see Goldberg & Dershowitz,
Declaring the Death Penalty Unconstitutional,83 HARV. L. REV. 1773, 1780 (1970) [hereinafter cited as Goldberg]; Comment, The Death Penalty Cases, 56 CALIF. L. REV. 1268, 1328
(1968).
31 99 U.S. at 136. "Unnecessary cruelty" apparently referred to the superadded
punishments.
32 Id. at 135.
33 136 U.S. 436 (1890). The Court held the eighth amendment inapplicable to the
states. Id. at 446.
34 Id. at 441.
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which were "manifestly cruel and unusual."8 5 Applying that standard
to the death penalty, the Court said that
[p]unishments are cruel when they involve torture or a lingering death; but the punishment of death is not cruel, within the
meaning of that word as used in the Constitution. It implies there
something inhuman and barbarous, something more than the mere
extinguishment of life. 6
The Court denied petitioner's application for a writ of habeas corpus,
holding that the eighth amendment did not apply to the states through
the fourteenth and there was no denial of due process by the State of
37
New York.
This historical approach was rejected in 1910 when the Court
decided Weems v. United States,38 and, for the first time, ruled that a
punishment provided by statute was cruel and unusual.39 Weems was
convicted of falsifying a public document for a nominal sum. 40 He was

sentenced to "fifteen years of Cadena, together with the accessories ...
and to pay a fine of four thousand pesetas ....

-41 Justice McKenna,

writing for the Court, determined that the scope of the eighth amendment must be measured by evolving standards:
Time works changes, brings into existence new conditions and
purposes. Therefore a principle to be vital must be capable of
wider application than the mischief which gave it birth. This is peculiarly true of constitutions. They are not ephemeral enactments,
designed to meet passing occasions. . . . In the application of a

constitution, therefore, our contemplation
cannot be only of what
42
has been but of what may be.

In reversing the conviction and sentence, the Court added a new
standard by which punishments were to be measured 43- a dispropor35 Id. at 446-47. Those punishments would include "burning at the stake, crucifixion,
breaking on the wheel." Id. at 446.
B6 Id. at 447.
37

Id. at 449.

38 217 U.S. 349 (1910).
39 Id. at 381.
40 Id. at 357-58.
41 Id. at 358. Cadena
involved imprisonment at hard and painful labor, always
chained at the wrists and ankles. Id. at 364.
The accessories mentioned were civil interdiction, which involved the deprivation of
parental authority, guardianship of property, martial authority, the right to dispose of
property by inter vivos acts; perpetual absolute disqualification, which involved deprivation of the right to hold office or vote; and subjection to life surveillance. Id.
42

Id. at 373.

ld. at 377, where the Court said:
It is cruel in its excess of imprisonment ....
Its punishments come under the
condemnation of the bill of rights, both on account of their degree and kind.
(emphasis added).
43
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tionate test. The Court measured the statutory punishment against
those given for similar or more serious offenses. The punishment to
which the defendant was sentenced was excessive when compared with
penalties for similar crimes in other jurisdictions, or for more severe
crimes in the same jurisdiction. The punishment was therefore disproportionate to the relative gravity of the offense. 44 The Court in
finding the penalty disproportionate adopted the view of the dissent
45
in an earlier case.
It was 1947 before the Court, in Louisiana ex rel. Francis v.
Resweber,46 again faced a major challenge based upon the cruel and
unusual punishment clause. The defendant was sentenced to death by
electrocution, but a malfunctioning electric chair prevented his scheduled execution from being completed. A second execution date was
set, and the defendant contended that this would be cruel and unusual
punishment. 47 The Court, in its plurality opinion, quoted with approval
from Kemmler its finding that "mere extinguishment of life" is not
unconstitutional cruelty. 48 The Court, in permitting the second attempt
at execution, stated that the Constitution protected a convicted man
against "cruelty inherent in the method of punishment, not the necessary suffering involved in any method employed to extinguish life
humanely."

49

Justice Frankfurter, concurring in the judgment in this 54
decision, refused to vote with the dissent although he personally agreed
with them. He felt that the principle set forth in Weems should be
applied; that it is not the intentions of the Framers, but the "consensus
44

Id. at 380-81; see Goldberg, supra note 30, at 1786; Comment, supra note 30, at

1330.
45 O'Neil v. Vermont, 144 U.S. 323 (1892). The defendant was sentenced to more
than 54 years imprisonment when he failed to pay a fine for the illegal sale of alcoholic
beverages. Justice Field, in his dissent, wrote:
That designation [cruel and unusual], it is true, is usually applied to punishments which inflict torture, such as the rack, the thumbscrew, the iron boot, the
stretching of limbs and the like, which are attended with acute pain and
suffering. . . . The inhibition is directed, not only against punishments of the
character mentioned, but against all punishments which by their excessive length
or severity are greatly disproportioned to the offences charged. The whole inhibition is against that which is excessive ....
Id. at 339-40.
46 329 U.S. 459 (1947).
47 Id. at 460-61, 464 (Reed, J., joined by Vinson, C.J., Black & Jackson, JJ., concurring) [hereinafter cited as Reed, J., concurring]. It might be noted that English law
required a second attempt at execution if the first attempt failed. See L. RADZINOWICZ,
A HISTORy OF ENGLISH CRIMINAL LAW 185-86 (1948).
48 329 U.S. at 463-64 n.4. (Reed, J., concurring) (quoting from Kemmler, 136 U.S. at
447).
49 Id. at 464.
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of society's opinion which, for purposes of due process, is the standard
enjoined by the Constitution. 5 ° It was his contention that for the
Court to overturn the executive action of the State of Louisiana, there
would have to be a gross violation of due process. 51 He concluded that
the second attempt at execution would not offend a "principle of
justice 'rooted in the traditions and conscience of our people.' "52
The Court continued to measure the eight amendment by evolving
standards when it decided Trop v. Dulles.53 The petitioner was convicted of war-time desertion by a military court-martial and was divested
of his citizenship. 54 The Court found that this punishment totally
destroyed a man's existence in organized society and concluded that the
function of the eighth amendment was to preserve the "dignity of
man.''5 There was no question of the disproportionate character of the
penalty since the death penalty could have been imposed. 56 The Court
inferred that the psychological torture experienced by an expatriate was
as intolerable to the Constitution as was physical torture.5 7
Justice Brennan, who cast the deciding vote in Trop, based his
concurrence on the ground that the punishment did not serve a legitimate legislative interest since there was no deterrent or rehabilitative
value and society was not protected from the offender. 58 A punishment based upon "naked vengeance" was beyond the power of Congress
to impose. 59
The decision of Robinson v. California60 marked the third and last
time, prior to the Furman case, that the Court overturned a statute and
sentence under it as violative of the eighth amendment's prohibition
of cruel and unusual punishment. The defendant was sentenced to
"not less than 90 days" imprisonment for being "addicted to the use of
narcotics." 61 The Court, although not citing Weems, seemed to apply
the disproportionate test, finding the punishment excessive because the
50 Id. at 471.
51 Id. at 470-72. Justice Frankfurter did not believe in incorporation. Id. at 467-69.
52 Id. at 470 (quoting from Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97, 105 (1934)).
53 356 U.S. 86 (1958).
54 Id. at 87 (Warren, C.J., joined by Black, Douglas & Whittaker, JJ., concurring)
[hereinafter cited as Warren, C.J., concurring].
55 Id. at 100-01.
56 Id. at 99.
57 Id. at 101-02; see Note, The Effectiveness of the Eighth Amendment: An Appraisal
of Cruel and Unusual Punishment, 36 N.Y.U.L. Rv. 846, 875 (1961).
58 356 U.S. at 111-12 (Brennan, J., concurring).
59 Id. at 112, 114.
60 570 U.S. 660 (1962).
61 Id. at 660-61.
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defendant was punished merely on account of his status. 62 Unlike Trop,
the punishment overturned was not inherently cruel and unusual but
was disproportionate in its application. This decision also settled the
question of whether the eighth amendment was applicable against the
63
states through the fourteenth.
It was with this background that the Court heard argument on the
application of the eighth amendment to the death penalty. The Court
first had to determine whether the Constitution itself provided a
barrier to a determination in favor of the petitioners by virtue of the
fifth and fourteenth amendments. These provisions, by providing
special protection for persons whose lives are threatened by state
action, 64 would seem to foreclose the idea that the Framers ever in65
tended to abolish the death penalty through the eighth amendment.
No other punishment received such specific mention in the Constitution. The application of the eighth amendment to the punishment
of death, suggested Justice Powell, was to be made on a case by case
basis, but the Constitution prohibited the judicial abolition of the
penalty in toto.66 Justice Brennan, while considering this contention,
felt that these provisions recognized a punishment which was common
at the time the Bill of Rights was adopted and merely provided
safeguards in the application of the punishment. It would seem unlikely
that the Framers would provide for the constitutionality of the death
67
penalty without specific language to that effect.
62 Id. at 667, where the Court said:
To be sure, imprisonment for ninety days is not, in the abstract, a punishment which is either cruel or unusual. But the question cannot be considered in
the abstract. Even one day in prison would be a cruel and unusual punishment
for the "crime" of having a common cold.
See 408 U.S. at 393 n.18 (Burger, C.J., dissenting). Comment, Making the Punishment
Fit the Crime, 77 HAkv. L. Rxv. 1071 (1964). Powell v. Texas, 392 U.S. 514 (1968) distinguishing Robinson, upheld a conviction for public drunkenness on the grounds that
it did not punish "status." Id. at 532 (Marshall, J., joined by Warren, C.J., Black & Harlan,
JJ., concurring).
63 370 U.S. at 666.
64 Justice Powell referred to U.S. CONsT. amend. V, which provides in part:
No person shall be held to answer for a capital . . . crime, unless on a
presentment or indictment of a Grand Jury . . .; nor shall any person be subject
for the same offence to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb . . . nor be
deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law ....
(emphasis
added).
He also referred to U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1, which provides in part:
[Nior shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without
due process of law ....
(emphasis added).
65 408 U.S. at 380 (Burger, C.J., dissenting), 418-20 (Powell, J., dissenting).
66 Id. at 420-21.
67 See 408 U.S. at 283 n.28.

SETON HALL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 4:244

Proceeding on the assumption that the Constitution would not
block its inquiry, the Court began to apply the principles of the eighth
68
amendment to the death penalty. It was agreed in the earlier cases
that punishments were cruel in the constitutional sense when they
involved the use of physical cruelty-torture-and, as such, would
violate the eighth amendment. Measured by those standards, the death
penalty had never been thought to be cruel. 69 But Weems took notice
that psychological cruelty was also brutalizing and degrading to the
human spirit. 70 Resweber seemed to indicate that psychological punishment could not be a violation of the eighth amendment, 71 but the
Trop decision appeared, in large part, to reverse that position. 72 Three
Justices in Furman indicated that the death penalty was cruel in its
psychological burden upon the condemned man, 73 with only Justice
Brennan suggesting that the death penalty might be physically in74
humane.
The concurring opinions can be distilled into five bases for the
majority's holding that the death penalty is cruel and unusual:
arbitrariness of infliction; discrimination in its application; unacceptableness to society; disproportionate to what is thought to be necessary;
and lack of a valid legislative basis.
All five members of the majority found that the death penalty
was inflicted arbitrarily. 75 It was argued by petitioners that the punishment of death, under discretionary statutes, 76 was inflicted in but a
small proportion of the cases and that those so sentenced were not
necessarily the worst offenders. 77 Justice Brennan concluded that the
fact that the death penalty is inflicted infrequently leads to a presumption that the infliction is arbitrary. This presumption can only be
rebutted by an explicit demonstration of "nonarbitrary [sic] inflic68 Louisiana ex rel. Francis v. Resweber, 329 U.S. at 463; In re Kemmler, 136 US. at
447; Wilkerson v. Utah, 99 U.S. at 136.
69 E.g., Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. at 99 (Warren, C.J., concurring); In re Kemmler,
136 U.S. at 447 (both dicta).
70 See 217 U.S. at 366.
71 See 329 U.S. at 464 (Reed, J., concurring).
72 See 356 U.S. at 101-02 (Warren, C.J., concurring).
78 See 408 U.S. at 245 (Douglas, J., concurring), 288 (Brennan, J., concurring), 346-48
(Marshall, J., concurring).
74 Id. at 288.
75 Id. at 249 (Douglas, J., concuring), 293 (Brennan, J., concurring), 309-10 (Stewart,
J., concurring), 313 (White, J., concurring); see id. at 363 (Marshall, J., concurring).
76 See notes 3,7 & 11 supra and accompanying text.
77 408 U.S. 309-10 (Stewart, J.,concurring), 434-35 (Powell, J., dissenting). At oral
argument, counsel for petitioner Furman suggested that the ratio of death sentences
imposed to capital convictions was 1 to 12-15. Id. at 435 n.19.
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tion."7 8 Without this demonstration the punishment "smacks of little

more than a lottery system."' 79 Justice White, admitting he could not
"prove" his conclusion from the data, determined that when
the death penalty is exacted with great infrequency even for the
most atrocious crimes . .. there is no meaningful basis for dis-

tinguishing the few cases in which it is imposed from the many
cases in which it is not.80
Justice Stewart found the death penalty " 'unusual' in the sense that
the penalty of death is infrequently imposed ....,,81 He concluded that
those condemned to die were "capriciously selected" and "the Eighth
and Fourteenth Amendments cannot tolerate the infliction of a sentence
' 82
of death ... so wantonly and so freakishly imposed.
Justice Marshall, although not specifically addressing himself to
arbitrary infliction, points out that convicted murderers are rarely
executed, and that, in passing sentence, potential recidivism does not
appear to be a factor in capital cases. 83 Justice Douglas suggested that
the extreme infrequency with which the death penalty was imposed
permits the " 'strong inference of arbitrariness.' "84
Two members of the Court found the death penalty to be applied
discriminatorily. Justice Marshall concluded that the evidence indicated
that the death penalty discriminated against minorities, the poor, and
the powerless.8 5 Justice Douglas decided that there is "equal protection
of the laws . . . implicit in the ban on 'cruel and unusual' punish-

ments."'86 Because
[a]ny law which is nondiscriminatory [sic] on its face may be
the Equal Protection Clause of
applied in such a way as to violate
87
the Fourteenth Amendment,
78 Id. at

293.

79 Id.
80 Id. at 313. In 1967, there were 88 first degree murder convictions and 17 death
sentences in California; in 1969, the figures were 87 and 8 respectively. 6 Cal. 3d at 653
n.41, 493 P.2d at 897, 100 Cal. Rptr. at 169. Until 1960, about 20% of those convicted
of murder in New Jersey received the death sentence. 408 U.S. at 435-36 n.19 (Powell,
J.,dissenting).
81 408 U.S. at 309.
82 Id. at 309-10.
83 Id. at 363. Recidivism refers to habitual criminality. See BLACK's LAW DICTIONARY
1435 (4th ed. 1968).
84 408 U.S. at 249 (quoting from Goldberg, supra note 30, at 1792).

408 U.S. at 364.
86 Id. at 257.
87 Id. (referring to Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356 (1886)); cf. Comment, supra
note 62. at 1077.
85
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Douglas would find that death penalty statutes which are applied discriminatorily are unconstitutional. 8
The members of the majority, in their discussion of arbitrary and
discriminatory infliction of the death penalty, utilized these bases to
establish the unusualness of the punishment. It must be noted, however, that. the word unusual has been ignored, for the most part, in
judicial construction of the eighth amendment. 9 If the word has
had any meaning at all historically, it meant something foreign or
new.9 0 Cases have, however, discussed arbitrariness without equating
it with unusualness.

91

Justices Brennan and Marshall concluded that the death penalty,
as inflicted today, was unacceptable to contemporary society. In Trop,
the plurality opinion by Chief Justice Warren contained this dictum:
Whatever the arguments may be against capital punishment, both
on moral grounds and in terms of accomplishing the purposes of
punishment-and they are forceful-the death penalty has been
employed throughout our history, and, in a day when it is still
widely accepted, it cannot be said to violate the constitutional
concept of cruelty. 92
Justice Brennan discussed the continual narrowing of the boundaries
within which the death penalty could be imposed. 93 Juries have used
their discretion to impose that penalty in fewer and fewer cases. As
Justice McKenna, speaking for the Court in Weems, wrote, the eighth
amendment was to "acquire meaning as public opinion becomes enlightened by a humane justice." 4 Brennan found that when the penalty
was authorized but imposed so rarely, society was indicating by its
reluctance its rejection of the punishment. "Indeed, the likelihood is
great that the punishment is tolerated only because of its disuse." 95
Justice Marshall concluded that in the determination of whether
408 U.S. at 257; see Comment, supra note 62, at 1082 n.35.
89 This was discussed by Chief Justice Warren in Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. at 100-01
n.32:
If the word "unusual" is to have any meaning apart from the word "cruel,"
however, the meaning should be the ordinary one, signifying something different
from that which is generally done.
Accord, 408 U.S. at 376-79 (Burger, C.J., dissenting). See also Note, supra note 57, at 850.
But see Goldberg, supra note 30, at 1789-90.
90 See, e.g., Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. at 377; In re Kemmler, 136 U.S. at 443.
91 Cf. Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. at 365-66; In re Kemmler, 136 U.S. at 443.
92 356 U.S. at 99.
93 408 U.S. at 296-99.
94 217 U.S. at 378.
95 408 U.S. at 300. Justice Powell notes that Congress has been adding new capital
statutes, e.g., Aircraft Piracy, 49 U.S.C. § 1472(i) (1970); Presidential Assassination, 18
U.S.C. § 1751 (1970); Congressional Assassination, 18 U.S.C. § 351 (1970). 408 U.S. at 437.
88
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a punishment is cruel and unusual, the opinions of a fully informed
citizenry were to be the standard. The penalty must be shocking and
offensive to its sense of justice, rather than shocking to the conscience
of the "people"-a test which is abstract and difficult to apply.96 Marshall's conclusion was that the citizenry, if fully informed, would find
the death penalty unacceptable because it rejects the moral values of
our society, discriminates against minorities, and creates the potential
97
for the execution of an innocent person.
The next major ground for the decision was that the death penalty
was disproportionate or excessive in its application.9 The Constitution
itself requires:
Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted. 99
As Justice Marshall observed, "[t]he entire thrust of the Eighth Amendment is ...

against 'that which is excessive.'

"100

Marshall took judicial

notice that over the past two centuries evidence has been accumulated
to demonstrate that capital punishment does not serve a purpose which
would not be equally well served by another punishment. He therefore
concluded that the death penalty was excessive and unnecessary. 101
Justice Stewart found that the death penalties imposed in these
cases were excessive because they "go beyond, not in degree but in
kind, the punishments that the state legislatures have determined to
be necessary.

10 2

Justice Brennan found that since the death penalty was arbitrary,
96 408 U.S. at 361. This test was apparently derived from Robinson v. California,
370 U.S. at 666. See Goldberg, supra note 30, at 1783. The latter standard was proposed
by Judge Frank in United States v. Rosenberg, 195 F.2d 583, 608 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,
344 U.S. 838 (1952). He had previously considered the standard to be the "attitude of
our ethical leaders." Repouille v. United States, 165 F.2d 152, 154 (1947) (dissenting
opinion).
97 408 U.S. at 363-69. Much evidence was submitted to support petitioners' contentions. E.g., THE DEATH PENALTY iN AMERiCA (H. Bedau ed. 1964); Bedau, The Courts,
the Constitution and Capital Punishment, 1968 UTAH L. REv. 201; Hearings on H.R.
8414, H.R. 8483, H.R. 9486, H.R. 3243, H.R. 193, H.R. 11797, and H.R. 12217 Before
Subcomm. No. 3 of the House Comm. on the Judiciary 92nd Cong., 2nd Sess, ser. 29, at
307 et seq. (1972) [hereinafter cited as Hearings].
98 The decision in Weems was almost entirely based upon this ground:
It is cruel in its excess of imprisonment and that which accompanies and follows
imprisonment.... Its punishments come under the condemnation of the bill of
rights, both on account of their degree and kind.
217 U.S. at 377 (emphasis added).
99 U.S. CONST amend. VIII (emphasis added).
100 408 U.S. at 332.
101 Id. at 358-59.
102

Id. at 309.
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and was disapproved by society, it served no purpose that a lesser punishment might serve equally well. He concluded that the death penalty
03
was excessive for the purposes for which it was imposed.1
Finally, three Justices concluded that the punishment of death did
not fulfill any social or legislative interest. Justice White concluded
that the infrequency with which the death penalty was imposed had
caused it to fail as an effective deterrent as well as a means of societal
04
retribution.
Justice Marshall listed six conceivable uses for the death penalty:
retribution, deterrence, prevention of recidivism, encouragement of
guilty pleas and confessions, eugenics, and economics. 10 5 He then concluded that either the purpose was not legitimate or the legitimate aim
was not effected. 10 6
Justice Brennan concluded that the manner in which the death
penalty was inflicted made the threat of such punishment "remote and
improbable." On this basis the death penalty could have no real deterrent value, 10 7 and the fulfillment of any retributive need was no more
effective than that from any other punishment. 0 8 Brennan would
103 Id. at 302-05.
104 Id. at 311-12.
105 Retribution is a proper function of punishment, see Williams v. New York, 337
U.S. 241, 248 (1949), but the authorities prohibit this as a sole end. Cf. Weems v. United
States, 217 U.S. at 381, where the Court said: "[C]rime is repressed by penalties of just,
(emphasis added); Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. at 112 (Brennan,
not tormenting, severity .
J., concurring).
Deterrence is, as yet, an open and hotly contested question. See Comment, supra
note 30, at 1275-92.
Recidivism is obviously prevented by the execution of a criminal, but the evidence
tends to indicate that capital prisoners, or those who could have been sentenced to death
for their crime, have the lowest recidivism rates. In addition, in arriving at its decision,
the jury does not attempt to separate the recidivists from those who are not. See Comment,
supra note 30, at 1292-97.
The death penalty, when used to encourage guilty pleas and confessions, is a violation
of the sixth amendment's guarantee of a trial by jury. United States v. Jackson, 390 U.S.
570, 583 (1968).
Eugenics has never been thought a proper goal in this country. 408 U.S. at 357
(Marshall, J., concurring).
Economics should not be a factor when considering human life. In fact, however,
it costs more to execute a convict than to keep him imprisoned for life. See Comment,
supra note 30, at 1311-13.
Justice Marshall discusses these points in 408 U.S. at 342-59. The four possible bases
for punishment considered by Justice Brennan in his concurring opinion in Trop were:
retribution, deterrence, isolation, and rehabilitation. 356 U.S. at 111-12.
106 408 U.S. at 342-59.
107 Id. at 302.
108 Id. at 304.
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place the burden upon the state to demonstrate that its bases for
punishment were valid by a clear and convincing showing. 10 9
A crucial question of law was whether society's retribution against
the accused was a valid legislative basis for punishment. While appellants suggested that there is no aspect of retribution which could be
satisfied by the relative handful sentenced to death," 0 even if retribution were achieved, it might not alone be an adequate basis for punishment. While Justice Stewart would not rule out retribution per se
as a valid basis,"' both Weems and Trop indicate that the eighth
amendment might not tolerate retribution as the sole legislative basis
for punishment. 12 Justices Brennan and Marshall concluded that the
11
death penalty would fail by that standard.
All the concurring opinions in Furman, upon close examination,
indicate that the system of discretionary sentencing was primarily at
fault. 1 4 All three petitioners were sentenced to death under discretionary statutes, 115 much like one whose validity under the due process
clause of the fourteenth amendment was examined by the Court only
last year in McGautha v. California.""In that case the Court held that
[i]n light of history, experience, and the present limitations
of human knowledge, we find it quite impossible to say that committing to the untrammeled discretion of the jury the power to
in capital cases is offensive to anything
pronounce life or death
117
in the Constitution.
109 Id. at 293.

The "compelling interest test" was proposed where state interests conflicted with
individual interests in property. It has been suggested that the state should also show
compelling interest when they wish to interfere with an individual's life. See Goldberg,
supra note 30, at 1785; Comment, supra note 30, at 1272.
Justice Goldberg suggested that the state show "compelling" interest rather than
"reasonable" justification for all fundamental, personal liberties in Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 497 (1965) (concurring opinion).
110 408 U.S. at 311 (White, J., concurring), 394 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
111 Id. at 308.

112 Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. at 112 (Brennan, J., concurring):
He who refuses to act as an American should no longer be an American-what
could be fairer? But I cannot see that this is anything other than forcing retribution from the offender-naked vengeance.
See Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. at 381:
The purpose of punishment is fulfilled, crime is repressed by penalties of just,
not tormenting, severity, its repetition is prevented, and hope is given for the
reformation of the criminal. (emphasis added).
113 408 U.S. at 304-05 (Brennan, J., concurring), 345 (Marshall, J., concurring).
114 Id. at 256-57 (Douglas, J., concurring), 293-95 (Brennan, J., concurring), 309-10
(Stewart, J., concurring), 313 (White, J., concurring), 365 (Marshall, J., concurring).
115 See text accompanying notes 3, 7, 11 supra.
116 402 U.S. 183 (1971).
117 Id. at 207.
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Discretion was granted to the juries, which had been exercising
such discretion de facto for some time. Juries had been known to
acquit, rather than convict, if they felt that the circumstances of the
crime did not justify the imposition of the death penalty. 118 This
discretion must be used wisely as "juries 'do little more-and must do
nothing less-than express the conscience of the community on the
ultimate question of life or death.'

"119

The Court in Furman appears to have disregarded McGautha
as precedent.120 Only Justice Douglas conceded that McGautha was
binding upon the Court in Furman,121 while Justices Marshall, Stewart
and Brennan, although mentioning the case and its problems, felt
123
that it was not controlling. 122 Justice White ignored it altogether.
Chief Justice Burger, in his dissent, remarked that "today's ruling has
...overrule[d] McGautha in the guise of an Eighth Amendment adjudication.' 124 However, McGautha considered the discretionary system operating at its theoretical best, a point which Brennan said
125
cannot be reached in practice.
The decision in Furman was, therefore, considered by the majority
as one of the first impression, and not in violation of the principle of
stare decisis.126 Only once before, in Boykin v. Alabama,12 7 has the

same issue which was decided in Furman been briefed and argued to
the Court, but that case was disposed on other grounds.128 The case
history of the eighth amendment might provide a basis for the contention that the constitutionality of the death penalty was decided sub
silentio.' 29 There is a profound difference, however, between a determination of constitutionality, and the assumption of that status without
118 Id. at 199.
119 Id. at 202 (quoting from Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 510, 519 (1968)).
120 See 408 U.S. at 248 n.11 (Douglas, J., concurring).
121

Id. at 248.

Id. at 295 (Brennan, J., concurring), 306-10 (Stewart, J., concurring), 329 n.37
(Marshall, J., concurring).
123 Id. at 310-14 (White, J., concurring).
122

124

Id. at 400.

See id. at 293-94.
E.g., id. at 329-30 n.37 (Marshall, J., concurring).
127 395 U.S. 238 (1969).
128 Id. at 249 n.3 (dissenting opinion); Ralph v. Warden, 438 F.2d 786, 789 (4th Cir.
1970), cert. denied, 408 US. 942 (1972); Goldberg, supra note 30, at 1775, 1798.
129 408 U.S. at 380 (Burger, C.J., dissenting), 417 (Powell, J., dissenting).
The decisions in Wilkerson, Kemmler and Resweber have been used to support this
argument. But in Wilkerson petitioner did not challenge the constitutionality of the
death penalty per se. 99 U.S. at 136-37. In Kemmler petitioner contended only that the
new mode of execution-electrocution-was unconstitutional. 136 U.S. at 441. In Resweber, petitioner claimed only that allowing a second attempt at execution would be
unconstitutional. 329 U.S. at 464. But see Comment, supra note 30, at 1334.
125
126
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so deciding.130 Traditional practices of judicial economy would, moreover, demand that the case in question be decided upon the narrowest
possible ground.' 31 In addition, Justice Marshall read Trop to permit
relaxation from all but very recent precedent, 32 as the standard
enunciated therein was not static, but "the evolving standards of
decency that mark the progress of a maturing society.' 33
The dissent offered some recent cases involving convictions under
capital statutes with subsequent sentences of death as precedent affirming the constitutional status of the death penalty. 134 Those cases, however, did not present an eighth amendment issue, but were disposed on
sixth and fourteenth amendment grounds. 135 According to Justice
Powell, if the constitutional status of the death penalty were not sound,
those decisions would be " 'singularly academic exercise[s].' -136 But

Justice Marshall pointed out that the issue in Furman was not covered
by the grants of certiorari for those cases, and therefore, they could
137
not be proffered as dispositive of the issue in the instant case.
The opinions by all four dissenters in Furman suggested that the
Court exceeded the bounds of self-restraint in its decision. 13 8 They felt
that the decision to abolish the death penalty was one for the legislative, or perhaps the executive branch, rather than the judiciary, which
is constitutionally insulated from public reaction.'3 9 But Justice White
noted that judicial review always involves a conflict between the legislature and the judiciary. "[T]his case is no different in kind from many
others, although it may have wider impact and provoke sharper disagreement.'

140

Other Justices hearing capital cases, however, held

other views:
130 Goldberg, supra note 30, at 1805.

131 Ashwander v. TVA, 297 U.S. 288, 347 (1936) (Brandeis, J., concurring).
132 408 U.S. at 329-30 n.37.
133 Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. at 101.
134 408 U.S. at 426 (Powell, J., dissenting) (citing McGautha v. California, 402 U.S.
183 (1971) and Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 510 (1968)).
135 402 U.S. at 196; 391 U.S. at 522.
136 408 U.S. at 427 (quoting from brief for State of Texas at 6).
137 408 U.S. at 329-30 n.37.
138 Id. at 403-05 (Burger, C.J., dissenting), 410-11 (Blackmun, J., dissenting), 461-65
(Powell, J., dissenting), 465-70 (Rehnquist, J., joined by Burger, C.J., Blackmun & Powell,
JJ., dissenting) [hereinafter cited as Rehnquist, J., dissenting]. Justice Rehnquist, who
devoted his entire opinion to this issue, concluded that the Furman decision was "not

an act of judgment, but rather an act of will." Id. at 468.
139 Id. at 466, 468 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
140 Id. at 314 (White, J., concurring). But there is a difference:
I do not concede that whatever process is "due" an offender faced with a fine or a
prison sentence necessarily satisfies the requirements of the Constitution in a
capital case. The distinction is by no means novel, ...
nor is it negligible, being
literally that between life and.death.
Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 77 (1957) (Harlan, J., concurring) (citation omitted).
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When the penalty is death, we, like state court judges, are
tempted to strain the evidence and even, in close cases, the law in
order to give a doubtfully condemned man another chance. 141
The reverberations from Furman will be great and have already
begun. It has been over five years since the last execution in the United
States. 14 2 Over six hundred men and women on death row have been
spared by this and the subsequent memorandum decisions of the
Court.143 Moreover, the Kentucky Court of Appeals ordered the execution of Robert Call for September 1, 1972, in apparent violation of
this decision. 44 Only eight years ago it was written that "[t]he
Supreme Court is obviously not about to declare that the death penalty
simpliciter is so cruel and unusual as to be constitutionally intolerable. ''145 But two recent decisions at lower levels did precisely the same
thing, while New Jersey struck down its death penalty for homocide
14
this year on another constitutional ground.
In 1970, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit decided in Ralph v. Warden147 that the death penalty was excessive,
and therefore cruel and unusual, when prescribed for the crime of rape
where life was neither taken nor endangered. 148 The California Supreme Court, by a 6-1 decision in People v. Anderson, ruled that the
Stein v. New York, 346 U.S. 156, 196 (1953).
The last man to be executed in the United States was Luis Jose Monge who died
in Colorado's gas chamber on June 2, 1967. Hearings,supra note 97, at 306.
143 E.g., Stewart v. Massachusetts, 408 U.S. 845 (1972); Koonce v. Oklahoma, 408 U.S.
934 (1972); Marks v. Louisiana, 408 U.S. 933 (1972); McCants v. Alabama, 408 U.S. 933
(1972); Miller v. Maryland, 408 U.S. 934 (1972); Scoleri v. Pennsylvania, 408 U.S. 934
(1972); Smith v. Washington, 408 U.S. 934 (1972); Billingsley v. New Jersey, 408 U.S.
934 (1972); Hurst v. Illinois, 408 U.S. 935 (1972); Thomas v. Florida, 408 U.S. 935 (1972);
Duisen v. Missouri, 408 U.S. 935 (1972); Walker v. Nevada, 408 U.S. 935 (1972); Davis v.
Connecticut, 408 U.S. 935 (1972); Irving v. Mississippi, 408 U.S. 935 (1972); Keaton v. Ohio,
408 U.S. 936 (1972); Kelbach v. Utah, 408 U.S. 935 (1972); Atkinson v. South Carolina, 408
U.S. 936 (1972); Hamby v. North Carolina, 408 U.S. 937 (1972); Alvarez v. Nebraska, 408
U.S. 937 (1972); Herron v. Tennessee, 408 U.S. 937 (1972); Williams v. Kentucky, 408 U.S.
938 (1972); Seeney v. Delaware, 408 U.S. 939 (1972); Brown v. Virginia, 408 U.S. 940 (1972);
Sims v. Eyman, 408 U.S. 934 (1972) (Arizona).
144 Commonwealth v. Call, Crim. No. (Ky. Ct. App., filed June 30, 1972). This order
was recalled in Call v. Commonwealth, Crim. No. - (Ky. Ct. App., filed Aug. 25, 1972).
145 Comment, supra note 62, at 1081.
146 Ralph v. Warden, 438 F.2d 786 (4th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 408 U.S. 942 (1972);
People v. Anderson, 6 Cal. 3d 628, 493 P.2d 880, 100 Cal. Rptr. 152, cert. denied, 406 U.S.
958 (1972); State v. Funicello, 60 N.J. 60, 286 A.2d 55 (1972). The decision was based upon
the use of the non-vult plea as determinative of the sentence. Id. at 65-67, 286 A.2d at
58-59; see United States v. Jackson, 390 U.S. 570 (1968).
147 438 F.2d 786 .(4th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 408 U.S. 942 (1972).
148 Id. at 793. This was first suggested in a dissent from the denial of certiorari in
Rudolph v. Alabama, 375 U.S. 889, 891 (1963) (Goldberg, J., joined by Douglas & Brennan, JJ.).
141
142
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death penalty per se was cruel and unusual, 1 49 although their basis was
not the eighth amendment but the California Constitution. 50 The
reasoning in that decision was quite close to that in Furman, close
enough for Justice Blackmun to suggest that perhaps the majority
might have used it as precedent. 151
Furman invalidated capital statutes in at least thirty-nine states,
in addition to those of the federal government, 1 52 although most state
court decisions have upheld the constitutionality of the death penalty,
probably relying upon the Supreme Court "precedent."' 153 In recent
times courts have withheld judgment, noting that the issue was presently before the Supreme Court. 54 Federal appeals courts have also
upheld the constitutionality of the death penalty. 155
The Furman decision gives the legislatures an opportunity, if not a
mandate, to determine the will of the people in their respective jurisdictions. The Court has referred to public opinion polls which indicate
that only fifty percent of the people in this country are in favor of
retaining the death penalty. 156 A better indication of popular opinion
is, perhaps, the regular refusal of jurors to impose the death penalty
in the great majority of cases, 157 or the difficulty that some prosecutors
149 6 Cal. 3d 628, 656, 493 P.2d 880, 899, 100 Cal. Rptr. 152, 171 (1972), cert. denied,
406 U.S. 958 (1972).
150 CAL. CONST. art. 1, § 6.
151 408 U.S. at 411.
152 Those states not authorizing the death penalty by statute are: Alaska, Hawaii,
Iowa, Maine, Michigan, Minnesota, Oregon, West Virginia and Wisconsin. Id. at 340 n.79
(Marshall, J., concurring). California had abolished the death penalty by judicial action.
See note 13 supra. Rhode Island's mandatory death penalty was not affected. See note 160
infra.
153 E.g., People v. St. Martin, 1 Cal. 3d 524, 463 P.2d 390, 83 Cal. Rptr. 166 (1970);
Manor v. State, 223 Ga. 594, 157 S.E.2d 431 (1967); State v. Forcella, 52 N.J. 263, 245 A.2d
181 (1968); Siros v. State, 399 S.W.2d 547 (Tex. Crim. App. 1966).
154 E.g., State v. Doss, 60 N.J. 32, 35, 286 A.2d 41, 42 (1972).
155 The circuits have been divided, however, in their reasoning. The fourth circuit,
before its decision in Ralph, had refused to decide the issue, assuming the death penalty
to be constitutional, until the Supreme Court acted. Ralph v. Pepersack, 335 F.2d 128, 141
(4th Cir. 1964). The eighth circuit has followed the same line. Maxwell v. Stephens, 348
F.2d 325, 332 (8th Cir. 1965). Dictum in a later opinion of the eighth circuit would leave
the impression, however, that the court considered the death penalty not cruel and
unusual. Jackson v. Bishop, 404 F.2d 571, 577-79 (8th Cir. 1968). The fifth circuit has
upheld the constitutionality of the death penalty without discussion. Powers v. Hauck,
399 F.2d 322, 325 (5th Cir. 1968); while the ninth circuit has read the case history of the
eighth amendment as having determined the constitutionality of the punishment. Jackson v. Dickson, 325 F.2d 573, 575 (9th Cir. 1963).
156 408 U.S. at 386 n.9 (Burger, C.J., dissenting). The utility of a public opinion poll
has been discussed judicially before. See, e.g., United States v. Rosenberg, 195 F.2d 583, 608
(2d Cir.), cert. denied, 344 U.S. 838 (1952).
157 See 408 U.S. 'at 299 (Brennan, J., concurring).
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have had in obtaining a jury. 8 The will of the people must be heard
and heeded by the legislatures; otherwise the Court will use its own
interpretation of that will in passing upon a re-enacted statute. 159 They
must provide a penalty that is mandatory for the crime, 160 or which
explicitly instructs the sentencing authority in making its penalty
162
decision,1 61 a mandate almost impossible to carry out.

Newly enacted mandatory death penalties may provide a disquieting sequel to Furman. Throughout its history the death penalty has
been employed in a successively more restricted manner; the enlightened idea being to provide such a penalty when it is absolutely necessary, allowing mercy whenever possible. 163 Furman could reverse that
trend. If legislatures choose to re-enact death statutes which are mandatory, the room for mercy is gone. The decision in Furman was made
64
because that system worked too well.

The Supreme Court has gradually narrowed the boundaries within
which the death penalty can be imposed. A defendant cannot plea
bargain away his right to a jury trial in order to avoid the death
penalty. 165 Death qualified juries are no longer permitted. 166 Now
the death penalty itself can no longer be imposed, except under those
67
few mandatory statutes not affected by Furman.
As long as the constitutionality of the penalty was an open question
there was the chance that the legislative 68 or executive branch might
act. Once argued, the Court had few choices: declare the death penalty
unconstitutional per se; decide that the death penalty was within con158
159

Bedau, supra note 97, at 207.
Cf. Louisiana ex rel. Francis v. Resweber, 329 U.S. at 471 (Frankfurter, J., con-

curring).
160 The only capital statute in Rhode Island, for murder by a life prisoner, requires
a mandatory death penalty. R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 11-23-2 (1970).
Other states also retain mandatory death penalties for certain offenses. E.g., N.J. STAT.
ANN. § 2A:148-1 (1969) (treason). Chief Justice Burger would rather have total abolition
of capital punishment than mandatory death penalties. 408 U.S. at 401.
161 See 408 U.S. at 400 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
162 See McGautha v. California, 402 U.S. at 204:
To identify before the fact those characteristics of criminal homicides and their
perpetrators which call for the death penalty, and to express these characteristics in language which can be fairly understood and applied by the sentencing
authority, appear to be tasks which are beyond present human ability.
163 See 408 U.S. at 388 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
164 Id. at 313 (White, J., concurring), 398 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
165 United States v. Jackson, 390 U.S. 570 (1968).
166 Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 510 (1968).
167 See statutes cited note 160 supra; 408 U.S. at 417 n.2 (Powell, J., dissenting).
168 E.g., Hearings, supra note 97. Both Chief Justice Burger and Justice Blackmun
wrote that they would act to abolish the death penalty were they members of the legislature or executive, 408 U.S. at 375 (Burger, C.J., dissenting), 406 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
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stitutional bounds; or take a middle path. The first choice might have
been an egregious usurpation of the function of the other branches of
government and a violation of the principles of judicial economy. The
second choice would have placed a decision on point in the law, a
decision that future courts might have great difficulty reversing despite
the "evolving standards of a maturing society." What was done was
perhaps the least of the evils.
If state death penalties are re-enacted, their prevalence may be
determinative. If but a few states re-enact capital statutes, it is quite
possible the Court will void them as aberrant. 19 Additionally, the
Court may, in the future, be faced with decisions on a crime by crime
basis. It may find the death penalty disproportionate to specific offenses,
such as rape. 170 Perhaps the long wait on death row while appeals are
being heard will be found, in reality, to be a "lingering death,"' 171 and
future scientific evidence may show us that today's supposedly humane
172
methods of execution do indeed cause cruel and unnecessary pain.
Justice Brennan began his opinion by challenging the Court to
determine the constitutional validity of the death penalty: " '[t]hat
issue confronts us, and the task of resolving it is inescapably ours.' ,173
The Court by its decision in Furman did not totally resolve that issue.
It did, however, make what appeared to many to be a significant advance
174
in the history of the eighth amendment.

Michael G. Kohn
See 408 U.S. at 385 (Burger, C.J., dissenting); Comment, supra note 62, at 1073.
Rape is punishable by death in certain federal jurisdictions. E.g., 18 U.S.C. § 2031
(1970). It is punishable by death in but sixteen of the states: ALA. CODE tit. 14, § 395
(1959); ARK. STAT. ANN. § 41-3403 (Supp. 1971); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 794.01 (Supp. 1972-73);
GA. CODE ANN. § 26-2001 (1972); KY. REV. STAT. § 435.090 (1962); LA. REV. STAT. § 14:42
(1950); MD. ANN CODE art. 27, § 462 (1971); Miss. CODE ANN. § 2358 (1956); Mo. REV. STAT.
§ 559.260 (1959); NEV. REV. STAT. § 200.363 (1967); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-21 (1969); OKLA.
STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 1115 (Supp. 1972-73); S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-72 (1952); TENN. CODE ANN.
§ 39-3702 (1956); TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. art. 1189 (1961); VA. CODE ANN. § 18.1-44 (Cum.
Supp. 1972).
171 In re Kemmler, 136 U.S. at 447.
172 See 408 U.S. at 273 (Brennan, J., concurring); Louisiana ex rel. Francis v. Resweber,
329 U.S. 464 (1946). See also Comment, supra note 30, at 1338-42; Hearings, supra note 97,
at 304-07.
173 408 U.S. at 258 (quoting from Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. at 103).
174 The last chapter is yet to be written, as the Court, early in its 1972 term, denied
rehearings in these cases. 409 U.S. - (1972).
169
170

